Abstract—The procedure for extracting a cryptographic key from noisy sources, such as biometrics and Physically Un- cloneable Functions (PUFs), is known as Fuzzy Extractor (FE). Although FE constructions deal with discrete sources, most noisy sources are continuous. While general purpose ternary computers have not succeeded in general use, heterogeneous computing systems with small ternary computing units dedicated to cryptographic functions have the potential to improve information assurance, and may also be designed to execute binary legacy codes.
The following code is implemented in MatLab.
The generation procedure takes the PUF Data1 as input and generates the Key1 and helper data(which is totally random).The reproduction procedure takes the PUF Data2 and helper data as input and generates Key2.If Key1=Key2 both of the PUF's have been generated from the same device.
The input is taken to be random for now, but you should add your own PUF inputs here.
For the full project with test data input and analysis using PUF's, and more explanation and detailed working e-mail me [email protected] .
Y. Dodis, R. Ostrovsky, L. Reyzin and A. Smith, “Fuzzy Extractors:How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data,”(A preliminary version of this paper appeared in Eurocrypt 2004) SIAMJ. Comput., 38(1), pp. 97–139, 2008.
Hyunho Kang, Yohei Hori, Toshihiro Katashita, Manabu Hagiwara, Keiichi Iwamura,'Cryptographic Key Generation from PUF Data Using Efficient Fuzzy Extractors',2014
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Video Tutorialmk-sp videourl=’videoimage=’videocontrolbar=none videoautostart=false videowidth=’580′ videoheight=’330′Yes, The Tool has actually been finaly launched and it is prepared for use! After you create the Product Code just go to the or and click “Redeem Product Code” after that the game will certainly be enhanced your account and you will certainly can play for FREE! You probably whant to understand how it works and what this device does?
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